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Introduction 
A recent paper by Kelleher (1) undertakes three tasks: 
1. To outline a framework for monetary policy which links both public 
and private sector credit creation. 
2. To examine recent monetary experience. 
3. To provide an outline of the role of fiscal policy in facilitating 
monetary stability. 
This paper examines each of these areas in the light of the author's 
findings. 
A Framework for Monetary Policy 
Despite the central position which the monetarist/fiscalist debate 
occupies in macroeconomic literature, an operational outline of the manner 
in which fiscal policy contributes to monetary formation in Ireland has been 
noticeably absent. The publication, by Kelleher, of a definition of monetary 
(M3) growth which explicitly incorporates Government borrowing is 
therefore greatly welcome. The classification of the counterparts of 
monetary growth by Kelleher, however, differ in some important respects 
from alternative presentations. These differences are highlighted beneath. 
Table 1 presents the incremental consolidated balance sheet for the banking 
system, 1976-1979. It contains two alternative measures of Balance of 
Payments disequilibrium or foreign exchange market pressure. Official 
External Reserves adjusted for allocations of SDRs (item A4-L7) 
corresponds closely to the Official Settlements concept of the Balance of 
Payments and "focuses attention on the balance of transactions which the 
monetary authorities undertake to influence the exchange rate" (2). Official 
External Reserves adjusted for SDR allocations plus the Net External Assets 
"!1 
TABLE 1: Incremental Balance Sheet of the Consolidated Banking System 
- December to December, 1976-1979 
£ million 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Liabilities 
L.1 Currency 49.4 47.2 79.4 120.5 
L.2 Current Accounts 63 144.9 163.5 7.5 
L.3 Deposit Accounts 237.7 265.6 691.6 666.5 
L.4 Government Deposits 97 64.5 -103.7 -16.6 
of Which: L4A Departmental Funds* 67.5 51 -165 -21 
L4B Other Government Deposits 29.5 13.5 62 4.4 
L.5 Net External Liabilities of Commercial Banks 93.3 264.7 -4.5 24.8 
L.6 Acceptance Liabilities -13.9 14.6 0.3 -7.7 
L.7 S.D.R. Allocation 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 
L.8 Capital and Reserves 134.8 81.0 48.9 76.7 
L.9 Other Liabilities 90.5 79.4 104.5 72.7 
Total: 751.8 961.9 980.0 954.7 
Assets 
A.1 Non-Government Lending 410.7 445.4 817.2 999.7 
A.2 Acceptance Credit -20.2 106.1 18.5 -124.4 
A.3 Government Lending 59.3 159.3 73.2 201.6 
A.4 Official External Reserves 279.5 245.2 51.2 -277.2 
A.5 Premises 6.5 8.8 13.5 27.5 
A.6 Other Assets 16.0 -2.9 6.4 127.5 
Source: Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin 1980 (1) Table 22. 
*Budgets 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980. 
TABLE 2: Changes in the Money Supply and its counterparts 1976-1979 
£ million 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Liabilities 
1. Money Supply (M3) 350 458 935 795 
(= Ll + L2 + L3) 
Assets 
2. Private Sector Credit 404 537 835 883 
(Al+ A2-L6) 
3. Net Government Lending -38 95 177 218 
(A3 -L4) 
4. Net Non-Monetary Assets of banking system -203 -154 -134 6 
(=AS+ A6 -LB -L9) 
5. Official External Reserves less SDR Allocation 280 245 51 288 
(= A4 - L7) 
6. Net External Assets of Licensed Banks -93 -265 +5 -25 
(= -LS) 
Source: Table 1. All figures rounded . 
........ 
TABLE 3: Changes in the Money Supply and Counterparts 1976-1979 
( derived from Kelleher op cit.) 
£ million 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
Liabilities 
1. Money Supply (M3) 350 458 935 780 
(Ll + L2 + L3) 
Assets 
2. Private Sector Credit 391 552 836 850 
(Al +A2-L6) 
3. Government Borrowing Requirement less 
Sales of Debt to Non-Bank Public 315 308 558 779 
(A3 - L4A + LlO) 
4. Net Non-Monetary Assets of banking system 219 182 192 93 
(A4 + A6 - LB - L9 - L4B) 
5. Net External Assets of Public Authorities -44 +45 -272 -736 
(A4 - L7 - LlO) 
6. Net External Assets of Licensed Banks -93 -265 +5 +20 
(-LS) 
Domestic Credit Expansion 2 + 3 
External Finance = 5 + 6 
Public Authorities Central Bank+ Government 
LlO = Exchequer foreign borrowing 
Source: C.B.Q.B. Winter 1979. Budget 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979. 
of the licensed banks (items A4-L7-L5) corresponds closely to the Balance 
of Non-Monetary Transactions concept. This broader measure is relevant 
when a country's Central Bank is capable of mobilizing the foreign exchange 
assets of commercial banks to mitigate the impact of payments imbalances 
on Official External Reserves. In such instances the latter alone convey an 
incomplete measure of the pressure to which the national currency is 
exposed in the foreign exchange market. Table 2 reorganises the 
consolidated balance sheet into changes in the money supply (Row 1) and 
its counterparts. These counterparts may be classified as domestic (Rows 2, 
3 and 4) and external (Row 5+6). A decline in the external counterpart is 
generally taken as evidence of excessive credit expansion by the domestic 
banking system and impairs the banking system's capacity to support the 
exchange rate. 
Kelleher's classification of the money supply and its counterparts, 
which differs in some important details of construction and interpretation 
from Table 2, is given in Table 3. It explicitly incorporates the contribution 
of the Government, through its Budgetary Policy, to Domestic Credit 
Expansion (DCE) and provides an alternative measure of exchange market 
pressure, namely, External Finance. 
External Finance 
The Government is consolidated with the banking system in respect of 
its 'monetary' transactions in Table 3 and the Government and Central Bank 
are jointly termed 'the Public Authorities'. Net foreign borrowing by the 
Exchequer is treated as an increase in the External Monetary Liabilities of 
Public Authorities. It is also a component of Domestic Credit Expansion 
(DCE) attributable to the Government. (The force of this treatment is to 
regard Exchequer borrowing as if the Central Bank incurred those borrowing 
from a foreign monetary authority and made domestic loans of equivalent 
value to the Exchequer.) The sum of the Net External Assets of the Public 
Authorities and the Licensed Banks is termed External Finance. This 
measure of exchange market pressure is used by Kelleher in preference to 
those already mentioned. It is a broader measure which embraces the foreign 
liabilities of the fiscal authority. It is also, however, subject to some 
reservations. First, exchange market pressure may, in part, be reflected by 
movements of the exchange rate itself. External Finance takes no account of 
such movements. Second, Balance of Payments disequilibrium concepts 
measure the value of transactions whcih can be regarded as "official 
financing': "compensating" or "accommodating" (Veil op cit). The inclusion 
of all Exchequer foreign borrowing in External Finance implies that all such 
borrowings have been undertaken for Balance of Payments purposes. It 
thereby fails to distinguish between 'autonomous' and 'compensating' 
official capital inflows. It is the latter which point to payments imbalance 
and indicate exchange market pressure. It is possible that net direct 
exchequer foreign borrowing provides a better measure of 'compensating' 
inflows. Third, External Finance treats official and private capital 
asymmetrically. The former are treated as external monetary liabilities 
(i.e. constituting a direct claim on Irish Reserves) while the latter are not. 
There appears to be little justification for this procedure other than to regard 
official capital inflows as 'non-productive'. It is doubtful that all official 
capital inflows can be made to bear this interpretation. Finally, an accurate 
measure of External Finance requires that both External Assets and 
Liabilities be valued at current exchange rates. The figure employed by 
Kelleher for net Exchequer foreign borrowing are taken from Budget tables 
and are valued at historical exchange rates. 
The two previously mentioned measures of exchange market pressure 
treat all official capital inflows as 'autonomous'. External Finance treats all 
official capital inflows as 'accommodating'. Neither measure is precise. The 
former will (in a fixed exchange rate economy) understate exchange market 
pressure, the latter will overstate it. Unfortunately, the absence of 
widespread agreement on a method of distinguishing between both types of 
inflow suggests that all the alternative measures discussed are useful but 
biased. 
The Government Contribution to DCE 
The contribution of fiscal policy to monetary formation is given as 
item 3 of Table 3 by Kelleher and is derived from Official Budget Statistics. 
Budget statistics cannot, however, be reconciled with official monetary 
statistics without certain modifications, as Table 4 illustrates. Column (a) 
contains revised updated statistics from the Central Bank Quarterly 
Bulletins. Column (b) contains provisional outtum statistics from Budget 
tables. Column ( c) records the discrepancies between both series. These arise 
in part from inadequate recording and updating of Budget statistics. Official 
Budget statistics, for instance, understate gross Exchequer borrowing from _ 
the banking system in 1976 by £13m. The budget failed to record an 
Exchequer repayment of £1lm to the Central Bank and understated 
Exchequer borrowing from the commercial banks by £24m. A second source 
of discrepancy arises principally from the use of different accounting 
conventions. Budget tables record departmental funds as the only Govern-
ment deposits held with the banking system. Central Bank statistics indicate 
that 'other government deposits' are additionally held. For Exchequer 
purposes an expenditure is deemed to have taken place during the accounts 
period (financial year) in which it was sanctioned. When such expenditures 
are sanctioned, departmental funds held by the Exchequer at the Central 
Bank are debited and the Paymaster General's account is correspondingly 
credited to permit issue of payment. This is the principal account contained 
in 'Other Government Deposits'. No monetary effects arise until these 
balances in the Paymaster General's account are drawn down. If they are not 
fully drawn down in the financial year in which they were sanctioned the 
monetary effects of Exchequer financing are partly carried over to the next 
financial year. In these instances Budget statistics understate the size of 
Government deposits with the Banking System. A variety of other accounts, 
in addition to the Paymaster General's, are also classified as with 'Other 
Government Deposits'. These appear to contain extra-budgetary funds and 
to be relatively small. These also create a discrepancy between budgetary and 
monetary statistics for Government deposits with the banking system. The 
understatement of Government deposits with the banking system contained 
in Budget tables (£29m in 1976) has contributed to an overstatement of 
net bank lending to the Exchequer (£16m in 1976) in each of the four years 
1976-1979. The amounts in general have been small except in 1978 when 
they were sizeable and resulted mainly from the large build-up of 'Other 
Government Deposits'. In that year the uptake of Goverment securities by 
the Associated Banks was about £100m below the amount indicated by the 
secondary ratio requirements due to tight bank liquidity. It is possible that 
this led to delays in the issue of Exchequer payments from the Postmaster 
General's account while alternative funding was being arranged. 
Table 5 presents updated figures for Exchequer borrowing amended in 
the light of the above consideration. These amended Budget statistics are 
consistent with official monetary statistics. Items 2, 3, 4 and 5 are treated as 
final figures. Exchequer borrowing from the non-bank public (item 1) is 
determined residually via the Exchequer borrowing requirement identity. 
The amended figures for this item differ from those employed by Kelleher 
TABLE 4: Net Government Borrowing from Domestic Banking System 1976-1979 
1976 
(a) (b) (c) = (a) 
(a) - (b) 
Central Budget Discrep- Central 
Bank Data aricy Bank 
Data Data 
1. Gross Borrowing from Banking 59 46 13 159 System 
of which: Commercial Banks 70 46 24 154 
Central Bank -11 - -11 5 
2. Government Deposits with Banking 97 68 29 64 System 
of which: Departmental Funds 68 68 - 51 
Other Government 29 29 13 Deposits -
3. = 1- 2. NetGoverrunentBorrowing 
-38 -22 -16 95 from Banking System 
Source: (a) Central Bank Quarterly Bulletin 1980 (1). Tables 15 and 22. 













(c) = (a) (b) (c) = (a) 
(a) - (b) (a) - (b) 
Discrep- Central Budget Discrep- Central 
ancy Bank Data ancy Bank 
Data Data 
5 73 67 6 202 
- 67 67 - 103 
5 6 - 6 99 
14 -104 -165 61 -17 
- -165 -165 - -21 
14 61 - 61 4 
-9 177 232 -55 219 
1979 
(b) (c) = 















TABLE 5: Exchequer Borrowing 1976-1979 (Amended) 
£ million 
J976 1977 
Domestic Non-Bank Public* 218 238 
Domestic Banking System (Gross) 59 159 
Net Foreign Borrowing 297 199 
Reduction in Departmental Funds** -68 -51 
(= 1 + 2 + 3 + 4) Exchequer Borrowing 506 545 Requirement 
*1 = 5 - (2 + 3 + 4) Includes miscellaneous borrowing. 







Source: 2 - C.B.Q.B. 1980 (1) Table 22. 
3 - C.B.Q.B. 1980 (1) Table 55; 1979 - Central Bank Estimate, p. 55 op cit. 
4 - Budget 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980. 







TABLE 6: Changes in the Money Supply (M3) and its Counterparts 
1976-1979 
£ million 
1976 1977 1978 
Liabilities 
1. Money Supply (M3) 350 458 935 
(LI+ L2 + L3) 
Assets 
2. Private Sector Credit 404 537 835 
(Al +A2-L6) 
3. Government Monetary Financing* 259 294 515 
(A3 - L4 + LIO) 
4. Net Non-Monetary Assets of banking system 203 -154 -133 
(AS - A6 - LS - L9) 
5. Net External Assets of Public Authorities 17 46 -287 
(A4 - L7 - LIO) 
6. Net External Assets of Commercial Banks 93 -265 +5 
(-L5) 
*Government Monetary Financing= Government Borrowing Requirement 
less Exchequer Borrowing from the Domestic Non-Bank Public. 








(see Table 1 op cit) and imply a resultant adjustment in the calculation of 
the Government's contribution DCE (item 3 Table 3), arising principally 
from the misclassification of 'Other Government Deposits' (item L4B 
Table 3). These adjustments to Table 3 are undertaken and presented in 
Table 6 which also benefits from the use of more recently updated monetary 
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TABLE 7: D.C.E. 1976-1979 
D.C.E. Government Contribution Non-Government Contribution to D.C.E. to D.C.E. 
as a % of previous as a% of previous as a% as a % of previous as a% 
Year £m year's money £m year's money of £m year's money of 
supply (M3) supply (M3) DCE supply (M3) DCE 
1976 663 27.1% 259 10.6% 39% 404 16.5% 61% 
1977 831 29.7% 294 10.5% 35% 537 19.2% 65% 
1978 1350 41.4% 515 15.8% 38% 835 25.6% 62% 
1979 1561 37.3% 678 16.2% 43% 883 21.1% 57% 
statistics. Table 6 and Table 2 are formally identical apart from the 
treatment of Exchequer Foreign Borrowing. 
The money supply (in Tables 2 and 6) may be expressed as M3 = R + D 
where R refers to the external counterpart (rows 5 + 6) and D refers to the 
domestic counterpart (rows = 2 + 3 + 4). The external counterpart in 
Kelleher's framework is External Finance. The domestic counterpart is 
DCE - I:::. Net non-monetary assets. A decline in net non-monetary assets 
involves a withdrawal of money from current circulation by the banking 
system which must be deducted from DCE to obtain the domestic 
counterpart hereafter called Net Credit Expansion (NCE). 
Combining the assumption of monetary equilibrium and a fixed 
exchange rate yields !:::.R = !:::.Md - !:::.D which suggests that any Net Credit 
Expansion in excess of the growth in money demand leads to a corresponding 
decline in External Finance. NCE and not DCE is the appropriate instrument 
in relation to External Finance. 
Recent Monetary Experience 
Table 7 gives the contribution of DCE to monetary growth with an 
analysis of the Government/non-Goverment shares in it.* The behaviour 
pattern of DCE and its constituents is broadly similar to that outlined by 
Kelleher (Table 2 op cit.) with the exception that both the Government 
contribution and (by implication) the contribution of DCE to monetary 
growth are overstated for each of the four years 1976-1979 by Kelleher. 
Table 8 summarizes the contribution of the domestic/external 
counterparts to monetary growth over the same period. The percentage 
growth of NCE in each year was excessive as evidenced by the associated 
decline in External Finance. The 37.4% growth of NCE in 1978 was 
dramatic and was repeated in 1979. By contrast, the percentage growth of 
DCE was higher in each of the three years to 1978 due to the net acquisition 
of non-monetary liabilities by the banking system in each of those years. In 
1979, however, net non-monetary liabilities remained virtually unchanged 
*Government/non-Government shares in NCE are not readily available. 
'Hi 
TABLE 8: Changes in the Money Supply (M3) and its Domestic Counter-
parts 1976-1979 
NCE External Finance t.M3 
% of previous 
£m 
% of Previous 
£m 
% of previous 
Year £m year'sM3 year'sM3 year'sM3 
1976 460 +18.8 -110 -4.5 350 +14.3 
1977 677 +24.2 -219 -7.8 458 +16.4 
1978 1217 +37.4 -282 -8.7 935 +28.7 
1979 1567 +37.4 -772 -18.4 795 +19.0 
Source: Table 6. 
Note: t.M3 = NCE + External Finance. 
due principally to the substantial growth of 'Other Assets' held· by the 
banking system (item A 6 Table 1). The specific content of this item is not 
readily available but its growth in 1979 offset the slow-down in the growth 
of DCE and left the growth of NCE unchanged at its previous year's rate of 
37.4%. If the growth of 'Other Assets' in 1979 stemmed directly from 
attempts to control DCE, then this factor needs to be considered in framing 
monetary controls or in setting a target for External Finance. 
The deterioration in External Finance evidenced by Kelleher (Table 3 
op cit.) is confirmed in Table 8. The very marked deterioration in 1979 may 
in fact understate exchange market pressure in that year. The break in the 
parity link with sterling allowed some exchange market pressure to be 'taken 
on the exchange rate', i.e. a depreciation against sterling. Further, if net 
direct Exchequer foreign borrowing were taken as a more appropriate 
measure of 'accommodating' capital inflows than net Exchequer foreign 
borrowing then the deterioration would be worse.* Net Exchequer foreign 
borrowing in 1979 was £459m, comprised of net direct borrowing of £509m 
and £50m net redemption of Government securities held by non-residents. 
The Appropriate Level of Government Borrowing 
Kelleher provides a useful illustration of how monetary targets might 
be operated in 1980 to achieve monetary stability. As noted earlier, the 
solution for External Finance may be expressed as 6R = 6Md - - 6D, i.e. the 
change in External Finance equals the difference between money demand 
growth and Net Credit Expansion. The zero change target for External 
Finance, i.e. 6R = 0, suggested by Kelleher for 1980, therefore requires that 
Net Credit Expansion be set equal to the growth in money demand, i.e. 
6D = 6Mct. Since money demand is projected to grow by 18% in 1980 this 
implies a target Net Credit Expansion of £900m. This is divided between the 
constituents of Net Credit Expansion (i.e. Private Sector Credit + Govern-
*This would amount to taking L. 10 in Table 6 as Net Direct Exchequer Foreign borrowing. 
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ment Monetary Financing + 6. Net Non-Monetary assets of the banking 
system) as follows:- Net Non-Monetary assets are projected to decline 
£150m, implying a target Domestic Credit Expansion (DCE) of £1,050m. 
The amended Central Bank guidelines of 15% for Private Sector Credit imply 
a target increase of £640m, which leaves Government Monetary Financing 
determined residually at £410m. In addition, Exchequer borrowing from the 
non-bank domestic public is projected at £300m, which yields a target 
Government Borrowing Requirement of £710m. 
While this policy experiment is extremely valuable in outlining the 
harmony required between monetary and fiscal actions necessary for 
(external) monetary stability, some difficulties, in addition to those raised 
by Kelleher, merit consideration. 
The objective of monetary stability may prove conflict with internal 
stabilization objectives. The process of policy formation outlined by 
Kelleher involves an implicit ranking of policy objectives with the broad 
outlines of Budgetary policy being dictated by monetary policy. This 
ranking is not without its critics. In deciding on the desired feasible com-
bination of policy objectives the advantages of reduced uncertainty 
associated with monetary stability · should be measured a,gainst the 
difficulties posed for fiscal policy and incomes policy. Even if the E;M.S. 
participation pre-empts these considerations, some further difficulties lie 
in the path of successful policy implementation. We will consider problems 
associated with each element of the 'reserve' flow equation 6.R = 6.Md _: 6.D 
in turn. 
External Finance !:ill 
While the need to arrest the recent deterioration in External Finance is 
scarcely in doubt, the choice of specific target for External Finance, i.e. 
6.R. = 0, taken as consistent with monetary stability is, of necessity, 
somewhat arbitrary. In view of its important implications for Budgetary 
policy, this is unfortunate. Furthermore, the target adopted could be 
achieved, in part at least, by semi-State bodies borrowing abroad directly in 
lieu of indirect foreign borrowing on their behalf by the Exchequer. Such a 
switch in the borrowing pattern could increase the net External Assets of 
'the authorities' without alleviating the underlying exchange market 
pressures. If the definition of 'the authorities' were broadened to include 
semi-State bodies, currently ruled out by statistical considerations, the 
resultant target for External Finance might, subject to the nature of the 
External borrowings, prove more appropriate. 
The Change in Money Demand 6.Md 
Abstracting from the above difficulty, the problem reduces to setting 
Net Credit Expansion equal to the growth in money demand. To do so 
requires, among other things, a stable, well defined demand for money 
function. The existence of such a function (for the U.K.) has recently been 
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questioned by the Governor of the Bank of England (3). Commenting on 
the very sharp fluctuations in the velocity of M3, he states, "the econometric 
equations, estimated earlier, neither forecast nor have since adequately 
explained this development" and surmises that their failure probably arises 
because wholesale deposits, one of the major constituents of M3, depends on 
relative interest rates rather than their average level. Furthermore, if an 
increase in average interest rates is associated with pressure on banks 
liquidity "the relative pattern of interest rates is liable to adjust adversely, 
leading to even faster growth in wholesale deposits, at least temporarily'~ 
This view is supported by Savage (4). The Governor also notes that the 
observed stability in the U.K., of the demand for narrow money, Ml "does 
not guarantee that the relationship would remain as stable under differing 
conditions, particularly if the authorities were to seek to control it more 
closely'~ These cautionary comments should be borne in mind in assessing 
the conclusions of Browne and O'Connell (5) that the demand for M3 in 
Ireland is stable. Also, forecasts of the demand for money are required in 
flow terms and these are noticeably less accurate than fore casts of the level 
of demand for money. 
Finally, the Reduced Government Borrowing Requirement (£710m) 
may interact adversely with the demand for money. Any net contractionary 
effects on income arising from reduced Budget deficit necessitate a 
downward revision in the demand for money. This in turn (in contrast to 
Keynesian models which would imply an improvement in External Finance 
due to the associated reduction in import demand) implies, via the 'reserve' 
flow equation, a deterioration in External Finance.* With unchanged targets, 
this process is cumulative until arrested by a fall in domestic interest rates 
below· foreign levels. This places a heavy adjustment burden on domestic 
interest rates since they may in part be governed by slowly yielding exchange 
rate expectations. 
Net Credit Expansion NCE 
The projected growth in the net non-monetary liabilities of the banking 
system (£150m) is arrived at summarily. The erratic behaviour of this item 
experienced in 1979 cautions against placing too much confidence in 
Kelleher's projection. 
The division of the Domestic Credit Expansion target (£1,050m) does 
not present any significant operational difficulties in Kelleher's analysis since 
Private Sector Credit (£640m) is determined by the Central Bank and 
Government Monetary Financing (£410m) is determined residually. This 
division, however, carries no implications of optimality. The quantitative 
credit controls it necessitates imply, if they are to prove effective, rationing, 
allocate inefficiency and may prove destabilising for certain industries, 
i.e. construction. Even if the allocative criteria employed were deemed 
*For a fuller elaboration of the differences between Keynesian and Monetarist modes of the Balance 
of Payments, see Johnson (6). 
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TABLE 9: Exchequer Borrowing; Budget Estimates and Provisional Out-
turns 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
1. Budget Estimate of Expenditure 2300 2708 3158 3789 
2. Budget Estimate of Revenue 1621 2135 2337 3010 
3. (1-2) Budget Estimate of Exchequer 
Borrowing Requirement 679 573 821 779 
4. Exchequer Borrowing Requirement; 
Provisional Outturn 506 545 810 1009 
5. (Provisional) Forecast Error in Exchequer 
Borrowing Requirement 173 28 11 -230 
6. Forecast Error as a% Expenditure 
Estimate 7.5 1 .35 6.1 
7. Forecast Error as a% Revenue 
Estimate 10.7 1.3 .47 7.6 
8. Forecast Error as% Exchequer 
Borrowing Requirement Estimate 25.5 4.9 1.34 29.5 
Budgetsl976,1977,1978, 1979,1980. 
satisfactory, the possibility remains that the semi-State bodies may switch 
sectors and incur 'crowding out' of the Private Sector unintended by the 
monetary targets. As noted earlier, a Public Sector Borrowing Requirement 
(PSBR) target might be a useful improvement over the Government 
Borrowing Requirement. 
The target Government Borrowing Requirement, even if unconstrained 
by incomes or domestic stabilization policy, might prove difficult to achieve. 
Government borrowing is the difference between two relatively large 
aggregates, Expenditure and Revenue. Relatively small forecasting errors in 
either, provided they are not offsetting, will result in relatively large 
forecasting errors in the Borrowing Requirement as Table 9 demonstrates. 
(For the U.K. the mean error of forecasts for PSBR has been of the order 
to £3 billion since 197 4.) It is possible that the larger forecasting errors 
experienced in Ireland in 1976 and 1979 result from the political environ-
ment in which the forecasts were made and that the smaller forecasting 
errors experienced in 1977 and 1978 provide a more accurate assessment of 
the Government's capacity to meet a Borrowing Requirement target and, 
further, that emerging errors may be controlled by supplementary tax 
provisions. However, if monetary targets are to be subject, as elsewhere, to 
intra-annual review, the customary one year time frame adopted for fiscal 
policy may need to be shortened. 
One component in the financing of the Borrowing Requirement, 
Exchequer borrowing from the Non-Bank Domestic Public which is 
dominated by gilt sales, may prove difficult to predict, "the effect of a 
change in short-term interest rates on gilt sales, and hence on the money 
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supply, tends to be highly unpredictable" (Savage op cit.). In 1977/78, gilt 
sales in the U.K. exceeded the PSBR. This difficulty occurs because the 
Government, to date, controls the price of gilts and market demand 
determines the uptake. If the Government instead controlled the quantity 
of gilts issued, then interest rates would become truly endogenous to the 
monetary sector and be governed, amongst other things, by exchange 
controls and exchange rate expectations. In addition to the implications of 
this for 'crowding out', some difficulties may remain in the division of 
purchases of gilts between the domestic and foreign public. 
Finally, DCE as a measure of monetary ease or stringency may be 
subject to distortions. This may arise from financial dis-intermediation (from 
the banking system) offsetting movements in the money supply or from 
changes in the monetary environment or in the collection process for official 
monetary statistics, as noted in a recent Central Bank Annual Report (7). 
An instance of this is the change in M3 for 1978, which is given as £860m 
in the 1979 Central Bank Annual Report and was subsequently revised up to 
£935m in the Winter report of the same year. The money supply had grown 
by 2.3o/cmore than initial statistics suggested. 
Conclusions 
Kelleher's framework is extremely valuable in identifying the harmony 
required between monetary and fiscal actions necessary for monetary 
stability. It presupposes that this is best measured by External Finance. 
The implicit policy mix required by an External Finance target requires 
more detailed consideration as does the sectoral impacts of the credit 
rationing which it necessitates. Furthermore, monetary targets are not 
subject to 'fine tuning' and may be overtaxed if forced to bear the entire 
burden of short run economic policy. These difficulties notwithstanding, 
the value of medium term monetary targets is not in doubt. The ease and 
simplicity which is sometimes claimed for their calculation and 
implementation is. 
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